Switzerland: Between Freedom of Speech and Collective Dignity by Belavusau, Uladzislau
Perinçek v. Switzerland: Between Freedom of Speech and
Collective Dignity
 verfassungsblog.de /perincek-v-switzerland-between-freedom-of-speech-and-collective-dignity/
On 15 October 2015, the Grand Chamber delivered its judgement in Perinçek v. Switzerland case.
Notwithstanding some minor variations in reasoning, the outcome in the Grand Chamber is practically identical
to the lower chamber. The Swiss criminal provision applied in the context of the denial of Armenian genocide
was, thus, again found irreconcilable with freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. I have previously
commented on the lower chamber judgement in a blog post entitled “Armenian Genocide versus Holocaust in
Strasbourg: Trivialisation in Comparison”. On the one hand, I have overall welcomed the Court’s decision to
protect freedom of speech against state censorship and instrumental memory politics. On the other hand, I have
expressed scepticism about the unconvincing way the Court has coined a hierarchy between the Holocaust and
the Armenian genocide. Such a hierarchy inevitably echoes sense of the symbolic injustice towards Armenian
communities and schizophrenic governance of memory within the Council of Europe, where only Holocaust
denial is exempted from the free-speech paradigm. Yet several aspects of the Grand Chamber’s judgement
make the reasoning in Strasbourg even more controversial and require further scrutiny. In this short commentary,
I offer a brief factual summary of the Perinçek case followed by a criticism of central findings by the Grand
Chamber.
Facts and Judgement
Doğu Perinçek, a former leader of a Turkish workers party, made a number of controversial statements on
several occasions during his visit to Switzerland in 2005, arguing that Armenian genocide is “an international lie”
by the “imperialists of the EU and US”. The courts in Switzerland found him guilty under the criminal provision
prohibiting denial or gross trivialization of genocides. After exhausting all the procedural tracks before Swiss
tribunals, Dr. Perinçek brought his claim to Strasbourg. In its initial judgement (17 December 2013), the
European Court of Human Rights has found that the criminal measure against Dr. Perinçek had disproportionally
violated his freedom of speech. In its Grand Chamber’s judgement, the Court has, thus, struck the difference
between protection of dignity for the Armenian community (embraced under Article 8 ECHR) and freedom of
speech for Dr. Perincek (Article 10 ECHR).
The arguments of the Grand Chamber can be summarized as follows:
The applicant’s statements bore on a matter of public interest and did not amount to a call for hatred or
intolerance (para. 229-241);
The context in which they were made had not been marked by heightened tensions or special historical
overtones in Switzerland (242-248);
The statements could not be regarded as affecting the dignity of the members of the Armenian community
to the point of requiring a criminal law response in Switzerland (para. 272-273);
There was no international law obligation for Switzerland to criminalise such statements (para. 258-268);
The Swiss courts appeared to have censured Mr. Perinçek simply for voicing an opinion that diverged
from the established ones in Switzerland, and the interference with his right to freedom of expression had
taken the serious form of a criminal conviction (para. 274-282).
The European Court of Human Rights is not a military tribunal and, therefore, was not expected to answer the
question of whether mass massacres of Armenians in the Ottoman Turkey amounted to genocide. Nonetheless,
the hearing before the Grand Chamber in January earlier this year looked like a perfectly theatrical trial with
multiple actors and staged speeches attempting to advance various historical narratives. Even the year of this
hearing is spectacular. 2015 marks the 100th anniversary of the tragic extermination of 1,5 million of Armenians
in the Ottoman Turkey widely addressed as “Armenian genocide”. While sadly enough, media attention was
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focused more on the fact that George Clooney’s wife represented the Armenian side, the Court’s building was
surrounded by a huge group of demonstrators with Turkish and Azeri flags clearly orchestrating this event as
their rehabilitation stage. It would be fair to say that the Court did not have any intention to facilitate such
rehabilitation, as much as, for example, the US Supreme Court certainly did not want to rehabilitate Nazi
atrocities when it justified parade with swastikas in a town in Illinois (Skokie, 1977). Yet its extremely lengthy
judgement – together with dissenting and concurring opinions comprising of 128 pages – definitely raises a
number of questions and is feasible for instrumentalization by Turkish and Azeri nationalists.
Problematic Aspects in the Court’s Reasoning
The Grand Chamber has, therefore, come to the same outcome as the Court did in its 2013 decision, namely
establishing violation of freedom of expression. This outcome is good news for a community of historians
mobilizing against state censorship on history. Elsewhere I have argued that criminal measures against genocide
denial make little practical or normative sense. However, the difference between the Holocaust and “the rest” of
mass atrocities established by the ECtHR is not only normatively problematic, but in practice invites further
speculation. Such speculation would foster nationalistic Turkic identity and anti-Armenianism amongst Turkish
and – after a recent military conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh – Azeri communities throughout the world.
The Court draws a difference between supposedly neutral comments of Perinçek, on the one hand, and
incitement to hatred, on the other hand. According to the Court, Dr. Perinçek advanced his statements as anti-
imperialist instead of anti-Armenian, taking a neutral tone on the relationship between Muslims and Armenians in
the Ottoman Empire. Just a couple of years earlier, however, in the case of Leroy v. France (2008), the Court
refused to accept a justification of a caricaturist drawing a parody on the terroristic attack in New York, who
claimed that his picture – instead of glorifying the atrocity – was simply a condensed anti-imperialist message.
On that questionable reasoning, not all Holocaust deniers express anti-Semitic messages. Yet the Court sees
them as inciting anti-Semitism or glorifying the atrocities against Jews. To give another example, the Court has
earlier found no violation of freedom of expression in a case where Germany imposed criminal sanctions on
animal rights activists. They collaged together pictures from Nazi concentration camps with animals in cages,
raising the awareness about the sufferings of animals. The Court’s neutral perception of Perinçek’s statements is
therefore paradoxical.
Perinçek is an active member of Talat Pasha Committee, an organization that is concerned with a rehabilitation
of the central military criminal, responsible for the massacres of Armenians, Mehmet Talat Pasha (1874-1921). It
remains enigmatic how an admirer of Talat Pasha may be less anti-Armenian than a neo-Nazi fan of Heinrich
Himmler being less anti-Semitic? Perinçek argues that Turks did not want a massacre of Armenians, while
Western and Russian imperialist forces provoked the Ottoman government. Similarly, many Holocaust deniers
and anti-Semites suggest that the Nazis just wanted to collect Jews together to transfer them to Palestine.
What distinguishes those two scenarios? Perinçek has orchestrated his statements to initiate the case for
revisionism before highest European courts. He later unsuccessfully tried to repeat it in Greece, a travel-tactics
familiar to a number of Holocaust deniers from the USA “guest lecturing” throughout Europe. Although
mentioning the tragic case of Hrant Dink, a Turkish-Armenian activist assassinated in 2007 in Istanbul, the Court
substantially disregards the specific atmosphere of denialism and gross violations of the rights of minorities in
Turkey, moving central attention instead to Switzerland where – supposedly – no tensions are possible on the
anti-Armenian grounds. The Court has failed to acknowledge the existence of the anti-Armenianism as a specific
ideology prevalent amongst Turkish and Azeri nationalists, including those scattered in huge Turkish diasporas in
Europe these days.
The Court found no international obligation to criminalize Armenian genocide denial, which is again an arguable
point. Similarly it would be very hard to deduce a strong and unequivocal international obligation to criminalize
Holocaust denial under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, mentioned by the Court. In para.
99, the Court summarises four divergent legal models existing within the Council of Europe with regard to
genocide denials: some countries do not have a criminalising clause, others penalize just Holocaust denials,
there are those who punish the denial of both Nazi and communist crimes, while there are also those punishing
the Armenian genocide denial and denials of similar historical injustices. Almost twenty countries, including the
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organizations like – ironically – the Council of Europe itself and the European Union, have recognized Armenian
genocide through various forms of soft law. The same month as the Grand Chamber’s decision came through,
Paraguay, for example, which is neither too close to Armenia or Turkey to mark any tensions between them, has
joined that list. While clearly, to recognize and to prohibit denial of a recognized fact are two different legal
modes, the judgment exposes the divergent and, at places, contradictory governance of history in European law.
Conclusions
A couple of years ago the US Supreme Court heard a case involving a picket of the Westboro Baptist Church
activists on the sidewalk close to the funeral of an American soldier who died in a vehicle accident in Iraq. The
sect glorifies deaths of American soldiers explaining them, inter alia, by the liberalization of homosexuality in the
USA. The demonstrators displayed placards with slogans such as “American is doomed”, “You are going to
Hell”, “America hates you”, “Fag troops”, “Thanks God for dead soldiers”, etc. In its 2011 judgement of Snyder v.
Phelps, the US Supreme Court has held this type of speech protected by the First Amendment.
Many would find this decision irreconcilable with the European legal context of militant democracies and
protection of dignity. Albert Snyder, the father of the killed marine, testified: “They turned this funeral into a media
circus and they wanted to hurt my family. They wanted their message heard and they didn’t care who they
stepped over. My son should have been buried with dignity, not with a bunch of clowns outside”. The majority
opinion in this judgement answers to this: “Westboro believes that America is flawed; many Americans might feel
the same about Westboro. Westboro’s funeral picketing is certainly hurtful and its contribution to public
discourse may be negligible […]. As a Nation we have chosen a different course – to protect even hurtful speech
on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate”.
The problem with the Strasbourg judgement in Perinçek is not that the Court defends freedom of speech under
Article 10 ECHR. Historical discussion should be exempted from instrumental state censorship in a democratic
state, even if that implies protection of a “bunch of clowns outside” and “negligible contribution to public
discourse”. The problem is that while acknowledging dignity of the Armenian community under Article 8 ECHR,
the Court fails to express the necessary outrage about Perinçek’s statements. This goes in clear contrast with
US judges acknowledging the hideousness of the message, even if they find it protected (Skokie 1977, R.A.V. v.
St. Paul 1992, Snyder v. Phelps 2011, etc.). In this judgment, Perinçek, in contrast, is positioned almost as a
partisan of free speech. In combination with an extremely questionable hierarchy between the Holocaust and
other genocides, this failure to distance from Perinçek – albeit rightly protecting his freedom of expression –
leaves strikingly little to sustain the dignity of the Armenian victims.
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imperialist instead of anti-Armenian, taking a neutral tone on the relationship between Muslims and Armenians in
the Ottoman Empire. Just a couple of years earlier, however, in the case of Leroy v. France (2008), the Court
refused to accept a justification of a caricaturist drawing a parody on the terroristic attack in New York, who
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the same about Westboro. Westboro’s funeral picketing is certainly hurtful and its contribution to public
discourse may be negligible […]. As a Nation we have chosen a different course – to protect even hurtful speech
on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate”.
The problem with the Strasbourg judgement in Perinçek is not that the Court defends freedom of speech under
Article 10 ECHR. Historical discussion should be exempted from instrumental state censorship in a democratic
state, even if that implies protection of a “bunch of clowns outside” and “negligible contribution to public
discourse”. The problem is that while acknowledging dignity of the Armenian community under Article 8 ECHR,
the Court fails to express the necessary outrage about Perinçek’s statements. This goes in clear contrast with
US judges acknowledging the hideousness of the message, even if they find it protected (Skokie 1977, R.A.V. v.
St. Paul 1992, Snyder v. Phelps 2011, etc.). In this judgment, Perinçek, in contrast, is positioned almost as a
partisan of free speech. In combination with an extremely questionable hierarchy between the Holocaust and
other genocides, this failure to distance from Perinçek – albeit rightly protecting his freedom of expression –
leaves strikingly little to sustain the dignity of the Armenian victims.
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